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Abstract 
 
Neoliberalism has not given rise to a sustained profit-led growth process, but to a finance-
dominated accumulation regime in which growth relies either on financial bubbles and rising 
household debt (‘debt-driven growth’) or on net exports (‘export-driven growth’). The 
financial crisis that began in the market for derivatives on the US subprime mortgage market 
has translated into the worst recession since the 1930s. In Europe the crisis has been 
amplified by an economic policy architecture (the Stability and Growth Pact) that aimed at 
restricting the role of fiscal policy and insulating monetary policy and central banks from 
national governments. The crisis has thus led to a sharp economic divergence between core 
and peripheral countries. Contrary to the situation in the (export-driven) Germanic core of 
Europe, the crisis is escalating in the (debt-driven) southern countries of Europe. The paper 
interprets the policy regime as the outcome of national elites’ attempt to use European 
integration as a means to constrain nation states. The result is a policy regime that has fatally 
weakened nation states as regards their fiscal and monetary capacities without creating a 
European state. 
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Introduction 
 
The financial crisis began in the market for derivatives of US subprime mortgages and 
translated into the worst recession since the 1930s in all advanced economies. However, five 
years after the crisis began the experience differs dramatically across countries. Only in 
Europe has the crisis mutated into a sovereign debt crisis. This paper offers an analysis that 
puts Neoliberalism at the very heart of the crisis in Europe – both as a cause of the 
imbalances at the root of the crisis and, specific to the EMU (Economic and Monetary 
Union), as an economic policy regime that has turned the financial crisis into a sovereign debt 
crisis.  
 
Neoliberalism has given rise to an unstable finance-dominated accumulation regime. It has 
not led to a sustained profit-led growth process, but to two complementary growth models 
that rely either on financial bubbles and rising household debt (‘debt-driven growth’) or on 
rising export surpluses (‘export-driven growth’). These two growth regimes can be observed 
across the world, but in Europe, their emergence is closely linked to the process of European 
integration along neoliberal lines. European Neoliberalism had, on the one hand, fostered 
financial deregulation and, as a consequence, financial flows that fuelled the housing bubbles 
in Spain and Ireland. On the other hand it has fixed exchange rates and created an economic 
policy regime that has allowed the German ruling classes to pursue an aggressive neo-
mercantilist strategy by suppressing wage growth in the wake of German unification. Trade 
imbalances as well as the build-up of debt are closely related to neoliberal strategies.  
 
European Neoliberalism is also at the root of the uniquely dysfunctional economic policy 
reaction to the crisis. The EMU came with an economic policy package that has downward 
flexible wages (or ‘internal devaluation’) as the preferred adjustment mechanism, which 
creates a deflationary bias and puts the adjustment burden on the deficit countries. It also has 
constrained national fiscal policies from counteracting the recession and, by trying not to play 
the lender of last resort (LOLR) for governments, but only for private banks, it has paved the 
way for sovereign debt crises.  
 
We will argue that this policy package is in part due to the strategy of (national) European 
capitalist classes which have aimed at curtailing the relatively corporatist nation states by 
imposing fiscal and monetary policy constraints. These constraints have become binding in 
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the crisis, putting welfare state arrangements in question and proving counterproductive as 
they impose pro-cyclical austerity policies on the countries in crisis. By separating money 
(and central banks) from governments they have created a highly unstable situation that 
undermines nation states’ ability to underwrite social compromises. The crisis thus threatens 
to turn into a political crisis of either the Euro system or its nation states. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses Neoliberalism and the EMU’s 
economic policy regime. Section 3 analyses the export-driven and debt-driven growth models 
in Europe. Section 4 highlights how the neoliberal European economic policy regime has 
amplified the crisis and discusses the dialectics of public and private debt. Section 5 
concludes by outlining a Keynesian alternative. 
 
European Neoliberalism  
 
There is an extensive debate on the nature of Neoliberalism (Foucault 2007, Harvey 2005, 
Brenner et al 2010, Duménil and Lévy 2004, Glyn 2006). Foucault (2007) points out a 
defining feature of neoliberal thought - while markets are regarded as a desirable and 
ubiquitous form of social organisation, they are not seen as natural and entirely self-
regulating; rather they have to be created and maintained. Institutions and competition policy 
now play a critical role. This is different from classical liberalism in which markets 
spontaneously spring into existence. Neo-liberalism is thus interventionist, while 
simultaneously positing the superiority of market relations. One of the achievements of 
Neoliberalism is that it has extended the sphere of economic analysis to non-economic and 
non-market activities – in particular, the public sector sphere is subjected to a regime that 
tries to emulate competitive relations where they do not exist and are not stable.  
 
While Neoliberalism is often associated with free market rhetoric even at the macro level, it 
is not necessarily opposed to government intervention on economic grounds. It is the political 
(and ultimately democratic) nature of the interventions that worries neoliberals. Government 
intervention is then pursued on rule-based and technocratic form (to counteract populist and 
opportunistic impulses of politicians and the electorate). To illustrate, modern economic 
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theory
1
 in the form of the so-called New Consensus Model or the ‘New Keynesian Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium’ models need central bank policy as an essential ingredient to 
obtain stability of the economic system. Monetary policy setting the interest rate should 
follow a Taylor rule or, more narrowly, an inflation target. These models are now the main 
ones used by central banks in which, according to them, economies would not reach 
equilibrium without government intervention.  
 
In this paper we take a regulationist approach
2
 and from this perspective neoliberalism has 
been very effective in reconfiguring the mode of regulation. Neoliberalism has to be 
understood in the context of a tension between a political project and a theoretical project, but 
we are ultimately referring to a political project that is reconfiguring the institutional space of 
capitalism and, consequently, its economic logic. By identifying Neoliberalism as a political 
project, we are giving up the well-defined utopian or theoretical template to which neo-
liberalism is aspiring to and opening it up for an analysis of the specific interests that shape 
neoliberal interventions (see also Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). In particular we will 
argue that neoliberalism can mean very different things in different places and give rise to 
dysfunctionalities even by the standards of its proponents. For the macroeconomic purposes 
of this paper the key characteristics of the ‘neoliberal mode of regulation’3 are the weakening 
of labour, internal and external financial deregulation and the EMU economic policy regime 
(Stockhammer 2008).  
 
In the Anglo-Saxon countries neoliberalism came with an outright attack on organized 
labour. The miners’ strike in Great Britain and the air traffic controller strike in the USA 
marked bitter defeats for labour. In continental Europe the organisational strength of labour 
was eroded by two decades of high unemployment, welfare state retrenchment and 
                                                 
1
 It is quite difficult to pin down what ‘mainstream economics’ is and to what extent it is ‘neo-liberal’. The 
NCM and NK-DSGE models are mainstream in economic policy (e.g. the IMF or the Central Banks use them). 
However, the mainstream in academic research is more in line with New Classical economics, i.e. stronger in 
the tradition of General Equilibrium models. These models are quite different from neo-liberalism of the 
Hayekian mode. Stockhammer and Ramskogler (2009) discuss recent developments in mainstream economics 
and use the term ‘enlightened neo-liberalism’ to refer to the turn in mainstream economics that puts institutions 
at the central place of the analysis (which is in sharp contrast to traditional General Equilibrium theory). 
2
 The term regulationist ‘framework’ or ‘approach’ rather than regulationist ‘theory’ is used as the Regulation 
School, is an ‘intermediate theory’ that offers a platform to analyze historically specific eras by encompassing 
socio-institutional as well as economic aspects and potentially allows for the (historically specific) integration of 
(among others) Keynesian and Marxian arguments, as attempted in this paper.  
3
 It is the outcome and institutionalization of various compromises and (in their intention often provisional) 
arrangements that acquire a certain degree of coherence. 
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globalization. The effects of these events on income distribution have been profound (see 
Atkinson et al. 2012 on top incomes and Stockhammer 2013b on wage shares).  
 
Financial deregulation has two dimensions: liberalization of international capital flows and 
the deregulation of domestic financial systems. This has led to fundamental changes in the 
financial landscape. At the international level, capital flows have been liberalized; 
domestically, changes in the financial framework have given rise to a rapid pace of financial 
innovation, eventually increasing the scope for speculation. Both developments have 
strengthened the influence of the financial sector. Real interest rates rose well above the 
growth rates of real GDP. Financial ratios such as stock market capitalization, derivatives 
turnover or cross-border lending have soared. Overall the income shares of financial capital 
have increased considerably (Duménil and Lévy 2001, Power et al. 2003). Moreover, the 
influence of financial investors on non-financial businesses has increased substantially under 
the so-called shareholder value revolution (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). These structural 
changes have been summarily called financialization and will play a key role in our analysis 
of the structure of accumulation (Stockhammer 2013a, Hein 2012).  
 
In continental Europe neoliberalism came, at least as far as economic policy is concerned, 
often in the guise of European integration and EU policies. In particular the free trade 
agreements of the Single European Act, competition policy, and, later, the services directive 
reflect the liberal creed. The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact combined 
an anti-inflation priority with a restriction on fiscal policy without offering adjustment 
mechanisms for the imbalances that it gave rise to. 
 
The economic policy regime in the Euro area is enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Stability and Growth Pact, and the Lisbon Treaty. Recent changes due to the Treaty for 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union will be 
discussed in Section 3. The basic structure can be summarized as follows: First, fiscal policy 
is essentially national policy. The EU budget, restricted to 2% of GDP, is too small and too 
inflexible to serve a macroeconomic function. It is simply not designed to provide a counter-
cyclical stimulus in case of crisis. Second, national fiscal policies are restricted in the short 
term as the budget deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP (except in severe recessions) and they 
must aim at a balanced budget in the medium term. Third, monetary policy is centralized at 
the EU level and it is effectively inflation targeting, with the independent ECB having set the 
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inflation target close to or below 2%. Fourth, financial markets are liberalized, internally as 
well externally. Thus the EU foregoes instruments of controlling credit growth or allocating 
credit. Fifth, there was a no bail-out clause, stating that neither other national governments 
nor the ECB will support individual countries which are facing problems in financing 
themselves (this is the only area where we will see fundamental changes in the policy setup). 
Sixth, labour markets are supposed to be flexible. The European Commission (EC) and the 
ECB regard wage flexibility as the cure to economic imbalances. By this they mean 
downward wage flexibility (they have not called for higher wages in Germany). But this anti-
labour bias should not hide the fact that within the economic policy regime of EMU there is 
an economic logic to the argument: with fiscal policy restrained, exchange rate policy 
abolished and monetary policy centralized, the standard economic policy tools are all 
paralyzed. The burden of adjustment has thus to be carried by the labour market and wage 
policy.  
 
The EU policy package is a form of neoliberalism. It is characterized by a strong belief in the 
efficiency of the market system, a distrust of state activity and an anti-labour bias. However, 
it is surprisingly difficult to pin down a theoretical case for monetary union. For example, 
while the design of EMU is often considered Monetarist, Monetarists have long defended 
flexible exchange rates. But Huerta de Soto (2012) offers a neo-Austrian defence of the Euro 
arguing that it constrains government intervention. Furthermore, the discussion of the EU in 
terms of the (mainstream) theory of optimal currency areas mostly concluded that the Euro 
area was not an optimal currency area.
4
  
 
The policy package was criticized sharply by Keynesian economists (Arestis et al 2001; 
Euromemo 2011; Hein and Truger 2005; Huffschmid 2005; Stockhammer 2011): first, they 
predicted, reliance on labour market flexibility in the adjustment will not generate full 
employment. Keynes (1937, chapter 19) had argued in the General Theory that wage 
flexibility in a crisis is likely to make things worse: wage cuts will lead to shrinking 
consumption demand and to deflation, which may depress demand further in a debt-burdened 
                                                 
4
 Optimal currency areas are defined as regions that are structurally similar, have high labour and capital 
mobility and/or fiscal redistribution. Southern and Northern European countries don’t fit that bill. The theory 
was pioneered by Mundell, a member of the (neoliberal) Mont Pèlerin Society. As Goodhart (1998) points out, 
optimal currency theory is built on the ‘metallist’ theory of money that interprets money as originating from 
private transactions, whereas Chartalist theories of money argue that money originates from the state and its 
ability to tax (and impose order). The Chartalist approach lends itself to a sceptical view of the Euro project, 
because it regards a money without state as not viable.  
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economy as the real (inflation-adjusted) value of debt increases. Second, the EU policy 
system would create a deflationary bias. In the case of imbalances within the EU, with some 
countries running trade deficits and others running trade surpluses, the burden of adjustment 
would effectively fall on the country with trade deficits. This creates a deflationary bias. The 
adjustment of the surplus countries would be inflationary and growth-oriented, whereas the 
adjustment of the deficit countries is deflationary. They have to dampen demand (to decrease 
imports) and lower their prices and wages (to restore competitiveness). The exclusive 
reliance on wages as the adjusting variable will create a downward pressure on wages and 
result in prolonged unemployment without solving the EU’s problems.  
 
We will argue that the form of the crisis in Europe is due to the specific neoliberal policy 
regime that the Euro area has established. The policy regime is, to a significant extent, the 
outcome of the peculiar neoliberal strategy in Europe whereby the elites of various countries 
sought to implement neoliberal policies at the European level for which they could not gain 
popular acceptance at the national level. This transnational class strategy has interacted in 
complex ways with different national interests and strategies. Much of what the EU has done 
has been about imposing constraints on the scope of economic activity of nation states. The 
aim here was not to abolish the nation state, but to change it. In the process nation states were 
critically weakened. The fiscal rules have restricted their abilities to react in the face of a 
crisis. And the loss of monetary sovereignty has meant that national governments have lost 
national lenders of last resort. In times of sovereign debt crisis this can lead to a fundamental 
weakening of the state. Together these two measure undermine the ability of nation states to 
stabilise economic activity and, indeed, to survive. They thereby also lose the ability to forge 
social compromise and to create stability. Of course, this was partly intended. The SGP and 
the ECB charter were meant to circumscribe the abilities of nation states. However, this 
policy regime also proves profoundly dysfunctional as it effectively worsens the economic 
crisis.  
 
Imbalances in Europe: German neo-mercantilism and debt-driven growth in the 
periphery 
 
Neoliberalism has given rise to a polarisation of income distribution expressed in rising 
profits and top incomes, but that has nowhere translated into an investment boom. One might 
think that capitalists invest their profits (indeed in Marx’s Capital they are forced to do so by 
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competitive pressures). Keynesians have long questioned this. In their view the investment 
decisions of capitalists are a category sui generis (often interpreted as driven by animal 
spirits). Rather than generating profit-led growth regime, Neoliberalism has had to rely on 
other means of stimulating demand. It has resulted in two distinct growth models, which are 
both unstable: debt-driven growth and export-driven growth. It is the interaction of these 
processes that gave rise to the imbalances that erupted in the crisis. The crisis is thus a crisis 
of neoliberalism in the sense that neoliberalism is at the very root of the crisis.   
 
We will use a Post Keynesian macro economic framework to clarify these arguments (Lavoie 
and Stockhammer 2012, Stockhammer 2011). This model goes back to Bhaduri and Marglin 
(1990) and allows for wage-led growth as well as profit-led growth. Simply put, in a wage-
led economy higher wages will have expansionary effects as workers have a higher 
consumption propensity than capitalists. In a profit-led economy, profits get re-invested and 
thus drive the growth process. More technically, a rise in the wage share has negative effect 
on investment (higher profits do lead to higher investment), a positive effect on consumption 
(because capitalists save more than workers) and a negative effect on net exports (because the 
higher wage share implies a loss of competitiveness). The net effect, i.e. whether an actual 
economy is wage-led or profit-led will depend on the relative size of the partial effects and 
may differ by country and time period.  
 
This model has given rise to a substantial empirical literature (Bowles and Boyer 1995, 
Stockhammer and Onaran 2004, Naastepad and Storm 2006-07, Barboso-Filho and Taylor 
2008, Hein and Vogel 2008, Stockhammer and Stehrer 2011, Onaran and Galanis 2012). The 
majority of empirical studies find that private domestic demand is wage-led. The size of the 
export effects will critically depend on the geographical unit that is analysed: for individual 
countries, in particular for small open economies, they will be substantial, whereas for the 
world economy overall they play no role. This is important for our context because while 
individual European countries may well be profit-led because of exports, the Euro area 
overall is a relatively closed economy and empirical evidence suggests that demand is wage- 
led (Stockhammer et al 2009, Onaran and Galanis 2012). 
 
So if the world economy is in a wage-led demand regime, how have economies grown at all? 
It’s important to realise that in the neoliberal era growth has nowhere been driven by business 
investment. Growth has not been the result of a profit-led growth regime. Rather, two 
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different growth models have emerged: the Anglo-Saxon countries developed a debt-driven 
growth model, which was driven by increasing household debt, strong consumption demand 
and, in some cases, a residential investment boom (Crouch 2009 refers to this as ‘privatised 
Keynesianism’). Other countries, namely Germany, China and Japan adopted an export-
driven growth model, where domestic demand is weak and growth relies on export surpluses. 
Germany pursued this strategy particularly aggressively with average real wages stagnating 
in the decade prior to the crisis and the sharpest increase in wage inequality among advanced 
economies (OECD 2008).
5
  
 
The peripheral European countries also followed a debt-driven growth model. While the level 
of household debt has been traditionally low, the increase in household debt, which is the 
variable relevant for consumption expenditures, has grown rapidly. Indeed, Table 1 shows 
that the increase in household debt in the southern European countries was not only above the 
increase in the northern European countries (with the exception of the Netherlands), but it 
also exceeded that of the USA and the UK. The rapid expansion of credit was made possible 
to a significant extent through European financial integration. The EC’s policy (namely the 
Financial Services Action Plan) aimed at creating a single financial market for Europe (Grahl 
2009). In theory this means uniform interest rates across Europe and in practise it meant 
massive capital flows from Germany, France and the UK to the peripheral European 
countries. While this initially fostered manufacturing investment (as in the case of Spain and 
Ireland), it soon fuelled an unsustainable property boom.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
At the same time the southern European countries experienced substantially higher price and 
wage inflation. As a consequence the south lost competitiveness. This is illustrated in Table 2 
which gives the growth in unit labour costs (ULC), a standard measure of cost 
competitiveness, from 2000-08. The southern European countries all had a growth of more 
than 24%, compared to a Euro area average of 16% and Germany at 3%. Together with fast 
growth in many southern countries, this resulted in substantial current account deficits, which 
were mirrored by export surpluses in the north. These surpluses were recycled as private 
credit flows back to the southern European countries, where they financed property bubbles 
                                                 
5
 Hein and Mundt (2012) offer a more in detailed classification the growth models of G20 countries. 
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and rising household debt.
6
 In fact the situation differed by country, but a massive increase in 
private household debt (in southern European countries) is the hallmark of this growth. With 
the exception of Greece, public debt was declining (see also de Grauwe 2010). 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The crisis, the EU policy regime and the nature of money 
 
The Global Financial Crisis began in the US subprime sector. The underlying factors of the 
crisis include financial deregulation, the rise in inequality and the international imbalances 
that had built up. These are directly tied to Neoliberalism and the two growth models in the 
finance-dominated accumulation regime. Initially the crisis hit debt-driven and export-driven 
economies equally hard. However the export-driven economies were quicker to recover as 
they were not suffering from a debt overhang. In the USA the crisis was countered by 
moderate counter-cyclical fiscal policy
7
 and by aggressive monetary policy in the form of 
QE.
8
 In the USA the crisis turned into a weak recovery. Economic policy in Europe was less 
anti-cyclical. While countries adopted stimulus packages in the first year of the crisis, fiscal 
policy turned to austerity more quickly and, worse, it became more restrictive in those 
countries hit hardest by the crisis after 2010. Monetary policy in the EU tried to avoid what is 
now known as unconventional monetary policy or quantitative easing (QE) as long as it 
could, but as the Euro crisis deepened, the ECB did expand its balance sheet. Given the 
different growth models and differences in economic policy, the crisis led to sharply different 
performances across Europe: a fragile recovery in the north and a depression in the southern 
European countries. 
 
While recent developments have vindicated Keynesian criticisms, the EU’s policy package 
has not changed direction, but become, as of today, more rigid and doctrinaire. The Treaty for 
                                                 
6
 Two qualifications are in place. First, actual trade relations are more complex relations. For example, 
Germany’s largest export surpluses are with Austria and with France. Austria has had export surpluses itself. 
France’s export position was rather balanced in the first half of the 2000s and deteriorated thereafter. Both 
countries had surpluses with southern European countries. Second, financial flows are quite independent of 
trade imbalances.  In particular French and British banks have had strong exposure to southern European banks, 
reflecting their positions as financial centres. 
7
 Fiscal policy was moderate in the sense that given the extent of the recession it was by far insufficient to 
ensure full employment. However, by historical standards it was indeed substantial. The budget deficit (in the 
USA) peaked at 10% of GDP and stayed above 7% for four years.  
8
 The increase in the balance sheet of the Fed corresponds to some 15% of GDP since 2008. 
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Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) has 
tightened the grip on fiscal policy (Grahl 2012). Constitutional debt breaks are to be 
introduced in the Euro member states; there will be an automatic obligation to austerity if 
public debt exceeds the 60% target (the 1/20 rule) and the European Commission will be 
involved in the national budget process (the European Semester). The one area where there 
has been a change in direction is with respect to the no bail-out clause. The EU has, belatedly, 
set up a collective fund for member states that have lost access to market finance (EFSF, 
EMF). This fund gives loans to the countries that are misleadingly referred to as ‘rescue 
packages’ and imposes conditionality that is similar in spirit (if not as far reaching) as IMF 
adjustment programmess.
9
 
 
Why was such a policy package adopted? The reasons are complex. First, and this is the 
factor we want to highlight, it was the political strategy of many national capitalist classes to 
pursue European integration as a means to curtail corporatist national states that proved 
resilient domestically (see Bonefeld 2002 for a similar argument)
10
. Second, the historical 
situation in the aftermath of the 1992/3 EMS crisis had made clear that the previous monetary 
regime was unsustainable. Monetary integration, or so it was widely perceived, either had to 
go all the way or national currencies had to be re-established. It was the southern European 
countries that wanted monetary integration, not Germany, as the high inflation countries had 
been burnt by the experience of the 1980s when they had to follow German interest rates 
without having a say in the determination of these rates. However, it was Germany (or the 
Bundesbank) who wrote the rules for the new currency. Third, for important actors, most 
especially the Bundesbank, monetarist ideology played a major role. The conservative nature 
of central banks in many corporatist countries requires further research as it does not 
necessarily reflect financial interests that are arguably less developed than in the Anglo-
Saxon countries. Fourth, on the part of some actors (namely Jacques Delors) there was an 
attempt to instrumentalise monetary integration for the project of European political 
                                                 
9
 The ‘rescue packages’ have in no case led to a decline in public debt. For example in the case of Greece public 
debt has increased from 113% 2008 to 160.6% 2012, in Ireland from 44.2% to 116.2% (according to the EC’s 
2012 spring forecast). Greece has not received financial aid, but rather public loans at rates well above the 
market rates of Germany. These loans are used to repay private lenders. Essentially the ‘rescue packages’ have 
been gigantic machineries to transform private debt into public debt. Credit Suisse estimates that the second 
Greek rescue package reduced the private sector share in the holding of Greek government debt from 62% to 
30% (Credit Suisse Economics Research 2012 ). 
10
 Bonefeld (2002) makes a more general argument about the history of European integration. While this is 
consistent with our argument, our claim only refers to the neo-liberal period after 1980. 
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integration. A common currency was regarded as a first step towards political integration 
(Delors 1994, pp. 237-43; Spolaore 2013).  
 
The crisis has illustrated the strong interdependence of the government sector and the 
financial system. More theoretically put, the crisis has highlighted the tension between the 
public and private nature of money. The crisis thus raises interesting questions about the 
nature of money and the state. 
 
To begin, note that the four arguments regarding EMU listed above imply very different 
views of the relation between the state and monetary sovereignty. The first argument (class 
strategy) wants to separate the state and money in order to shift the policy goals. The second 
argument (high inflation countries in favour of integration to have a say in interest rates) 
implies that countries have already lost monetary sovereignty (implicitly the ability to set 
interest rates, in fact in normal times a key feature, is conflated with monetary sovereignty). 
The third (monetarist) view argues that money and the state can be separated due to the 
private nature of money.
11
 The fourth argument implies that monetary sovereignty and the 
state cannot be separated and thus monetary integration must necessarily be followed by 
political integration.  
 
Economic theory is divided on the theory of money. Mainstream economics (and indeed parts 
of Marxian theory) regard money as emerging from private transactions. In classical 
economics (and Marx) gold can become money because it has value as a commodity. By 
contrast, Post-Keynesian theory and other heterodox traditions stress that debt relations and 
in particular government debt and the ability of governments to collect taxes in their own 
currency are the foundation of money (Goodhart 1998; see also Graeber 2011 chapters 2 and 
3). Ingham (2004) stresses the state origin of money, but highlights that the social mode of 
production of credit money is through private banks. Money thus is a contested field that has 
sovereign power as a constituent element, but private institutions are critically involved. This 
is also reflected in central banks. Most central banks were originally founded in order to 
strengthen state finances and later acquired bank supervision functions. Central banks were 
first LOLR for the state and only later became LOLR for private banks. Most countries’ 
                                                 
11
 In the Monetarist view, the central bank should be a public institution, but rule-bound and independent of 
governments. The origin of money is found in economising private market transactions (Goodhart 1998). The 
separation of the nation-state and money is thus regarded as unproblematic. 
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central banks are public-private hybrids, often with commercial bank representation on the 
crucial decision-making bodies. However, in the process of EMU, central bank independence 
was strengthened and the ECB was forbidden to fund governments directly. That is by design 
it was meant to be a LOLR for the private sector only. Money and monetary policy was to be 
insulated from the political process.  
 
While these debates on the nature of money may appear academic, closely related issues 
surface in the present crisis in how public and private debt are related. Public debt is a private 
asset. Most government bonds are held by private banks and pension funds. Public debt is 
essential for the working of the private financial sector. It forms the most important collateral 
used on money markets and repo markets (Gabor 2013, Mehrling 2011). The credibility of 
public debt is thus essential for the functioning of private debt markets. A sovereign debt 
crisis also poses a mortal threat to the respective country’s banks, as they usually lose access 
to the private financial markets. In Euro area this is amplified by contagion effects as the 
credibility of one country’s sovereign debt calls into question the quality of another country’s 
assets. But this dialectic between private and public debt goes further. The credibility of 
public debt depends, in many cases, on the assessment of private financial institutions. In the 
case of Spain and Italy, debt levels were clearly sustainable at the interest levels prior to the 
crisis. After the financial crisis, interest spreads on southern European countries increased 
sharply; essentially the banks started speculating against the governments that had rescued 
them (Weeks 2013). There clearly will be some interest rate (and the 7% rate that is 
frequently used as a benchmark seems plausible) where debt levels are unsustainable (in the 
sense of unserviceable).  
 
From the autumn of 2008 central banks in the USA, the UK and the Euro area embarked on 
QE, i.e. aggressively expanding their balance sheets. The orders of magnitude are substantial: 
central bank balance sheets tripled in size, expanding from some 6% of GDP to more than 
20%. Central banks initially focused on buying private assets, but from spring 2009 the Fed 
and the BoE increasingly bought government bonds, i.e. they supported government 
spending. The ECB was, in the early phase of the financial crisis, much more hesitant. It 
started quantitative easing later, expanded its balance sheet less, and has hardly bought 
government bonds. At the same time (like its American and British counterparts), it has 
expanded the range of credit to private financial institutions (Pisani-Ferry and Wolff 2012). 
In short, the ECB is playing the role of lender of last resort for the financial sector, but – 
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different from the Fed and the BoE –not for the government sector. Only in August 2012, 
when the Greek sovereign debt crisis threatened to engulf the other Euro member states, did 
the ECB commit to buying government bonds (under the condition that those countries 
submitted to the conditionality of the bailout packages – the so-called Outright Monetary 
Transactions, OMT, programme). For several European countries the situation is now similar 
to that of developing countries which have debts in a foreign currency. 
 
The crisis is, in our view, due to the fact that political forces in Europe have built half a 
European state, while they have seriously damaged the ability of nation states to counter an 
economic crisis (and by implication) to underwrite social compromises. This is not an 
accident. In our analysis, this particular form of European integration is the outcome of a 
strategy of European national capital classes that have used European integration to 
undermine the, in their view, excessively corporatist and Keynesian (national) states. The 
incapacitation of nation states has several dimensions. The restrictions on fiscal policy 
directly impede governments on the expenditure side. In particular it has forced those 
countries most desperately in need of expansionary fiscal policies to pursue austerity.
12
 The 
loss of monetary sovereignty means that countries cannot set interest rates and, more 
importantly in times of sovereign debt crisis, they don’t have the lender of last resort facility 
to support the government. This effectively turns what would have been (under the EMS 
regime) an exchange rate crisis into a sovereign debt crisis, with a great deal of similarity to 
debt in a foreign currency. Third, the set of rules effectively leaves few policy variables at the 
states’ availability and encourages a wage policy that aims at competitive devaluation.  
 
So, how have the national bourgeoisies fared? In the south, they got many of the reforms they 
wanted (in particular with respect to the labour market and the welfare state), but under 
conditions that they didn’t want. By this we mean the recession, but also the increasing 
influence of the German government as well as of German capital. In the north, capital could 
push further desired changes in policy regimes, but they are in danger of paying for 
substantial parts of the costs either in the form of inter-country transfers or in the form of debt 
restructuring in which their countries would have to shoulder (some of) the costs of the crisis. 
Meanwhile, European labour is divided not only along national lines, with their experience of 
                                                 
12
 It is difficult to assess the relative impact of this historically. After the EMS crisis the deficit countries also 
pursued austerity policies, but the effects of the latter were alleviated by simultaneous devaluation. 
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the crisis differing sharply between themselves: Germany having a lower unemployment than 
before the crisis and the southern countries having the unemployment rates of the Great 
Depression. 
 
There is an alternative 
 
This paper tells a rather gloomy story, but it also highlights that European Neoliberalism, 
while so far successful politically, has created a mess economically. Europe now faces 
several challenges. It has to re-balance its trade flows and cost and price levels. And it has to 
deal with high private and public debt. In principle the cost imbalances can be dealt with by 
inflationary adjustment (that is adjustment in the surplus countries to increase prices and 
output) or by deflationary adjustment in the deficit countries.
13
 The latter is presently being 
pursued under the name of ‘internal devaluation’. The high levels of debt, when considered 
unsustainable can be dealt with by letting economic units go bankrupt, by debt restructuring 
or by bail-outs.  
 
A Keynesian economic strategy aims for an inflationary adjustment strategy (simply put: 
higher wage growth in Germany and expansionary fiscal policy across Europe). For short-
term crisis management, European Central Bank intervention on public debt markets is 
essential, but Europe needs a complete overhaul of its economic policy mix, one that 
thoroughly breaks with Neoliberalism.  
 
First, there needs to be a rethink of wage policy. The present policy regime preaches wage 
flexibility and has led to declining wage shares across Europe. Instead, Europe needs a 
system of transnationally coordinated wage bargaining that takes into consideration issues of 
equity and trade balances. This would imply a strengthening of collective bargaining 
structures and ought to be complemented by a European system of national minimum wages 
(as many countries, including now Germany, have substantial segments of workers that are 
not covered by collective bargaining agreements; Schulten and Watt 2007). The 
macroeconomic aim of European wage coordination ought to be higher wage growth in the 
trade surplus countries, which would help prevent imbalances. Simply put, southern 
                                                 
13
 Stockhammer and Sotiropoulos (2012) find that the internal devaluation strategy presently pursued would 
require a reduction of 23-47% of GDP in the southern European countries in order to balance the current 
account imbalances. 
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European countries need much higher wage growth in Germany – or else they have to go into 
deflation. 
 
Second, there need to be a rethink on how to treat finance. Debt-driven growth in 
consumption is unsustainable. Bankruptcy is economically disruptive. Debt restructuring will 
in some cases be necessary to make debt manageable, but in general the Keynesian strategy 
aims at raising income rather than deleting debt. An inflationary environment would greatly 
facilitate reducing the debt level. To counteract the regressive distributional effects of bank 
rescues, a substantial wealth tax would have to be introduced. At the same time the bail-out 
of financial institutions would have to come with proper socialisation to ensure change in 
management practises. A financial sector dominated by not-for-profit institutions would be 
desirable. Speed bumps on national as well as international financial transactions would have 
to be implemented in the form of macroprudential policy (that aims at controlling the growth 
of credit) and/or by a Financial Transactions Tax and asset-based reserve requirements that 
counteract the self-reinforcing loop between asset prices and credit.  
 
Third, there needs to be a robust mechanism of redistribution across regions that does not rely 
on generosity and bail-outs. There is a simple solution to this: a European social security 
system. A European tax on profits that finances social expenditures, say unemployment 
benefits, would redistribute income from prosperous to depressed regions without increasing 
debt levels. This would build what Europe needs: a system of funding financial flows to 
deficit units that does not create rising liabilities for either the private or the public sector. It 
will no doubt be difficult to institute this mechanism and there are good reasons why various 
institutions of the labour movement have so far been opposed to transferring social policy 
competences to the European level: the European level has typically been more prone to pro-
capital lobbying than national institutions. A European social security system would thus 
have to come with institution-building that guaranteed a role for labour organisations (or 
more broadly labour and capital) in the administration and funding decisions of the 
institution. 
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Effectively, these measures would amount to the creation of a European welfare state. This 
could give a new life to the project of European integration. And it would make economic 
sense. 
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Table 1. Increase in household debt (in % GDP), 2000-08 
Northern European Countries Anglo-Saxon Countries 
Germany  -11.3  USA 26  
Netherlands  32.8  United Kingdom 28.1  
Austria 7.9  Southern European Countries 
France 15.8 Ireland 62.7  
  Greece 35.5  
  Spain 33.8  
  Portugal 27.4  
Source: Eurostat, except USA: FoF   
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Table 2. Increase in unit labour costs (ULC), 2000-08 
Northern European Countries Southern European Countries 
Germany 3% Ireland 33% 
Netherlands 19% Greece 26% 
Austria 9% Spain 30% 
  Italy 27% 
Euro Area (12) 16% Portugal 24% 
Source: AMECO 
 
 
